labrys, études féministes/ estudos feministas
julho/ 2016- junho 2017 /juillet 2016-juin 2017

CARE AND RIGHTS: A FEASIBLE PAIRING?

THE CONTRIBUTION OF FEMINIST STUDIES

Isabel Fanlo Cortés

Abstract

This article analyses the main contributions of feminist studies to the discussion of the issue of care. In particular, attention is paid to the efforts made by the exponents of the so-called second generation of the ethics of care, in the direction of releasing the dimension of care from the narrow confines of the private sphere and extending its relevance to the public sphere and the field of political demands. Moreover, it brings to light the significant critical potential presented by feminist studies dedicated to care, in drawing attention to a neglected, if not denied, aspect in modern political history, i.e. dependence on relationships and vulnerability as universal conditions of human beings. Finally, the article presents some of the reasons why it is believed that the care-rights pairing is not only a feasible pairing but also a strategically necessary one.

Key words: care, rights, ethics of care, dependence

1.      Introduction

Starting from Carol Gilligan’s famous work, In a different voice (Gilligan, 1982), feminist studies, mostly carried out within the Anglo-Saxon cultural context, started to pay increased attention to the theme of care, which is analysed from different perspectives and within various disciplinary fields: bioethics, psychology, moral and political philosophy, legal philosophy, sociology, pedagogy and many others (Casalini 2015; Garrau-Le Goff, 2010)

The definitions of ‘care’ used within the framework of such studies are not always identical, but they all concur in considering care primarily as a practice, i.e. a set of activities mainly (but not only) associated with the field of "social reproduction", and also a contextual practice, i.e. a practice bound to the concrete relationships in which individuals are involved. This practice that does not originate from mere solidarity, nor does it coincide with the size of the gift, but rather calls into question a number of skills and social capacities that, to quote Nancy Fraser, are those available

 «[…]for birthing and raising children, caring for friends and family members, maintaining households and broader communities, and sustaining social connections more generally» (Fraser, 2016: 99).

If care, as conceived above, has historically been assigned to women and generally been undervalued (including as unpaid labour, as opposed to "productive" labour), the advocates of the ethics of care, albeit through different approaches, underline that such activities are not only indispensable for society, but also constitute an essential scope of the realization of the individual and collective self. This is also the basis of the assumption that subjects cannot be conceived in terms of entities that do not depend on relationships of care and responsibility, but, on the contrary, that the condition of humanity consists of dependence on others: not "others" as a general category, but specific others with concrete needs arising from the dynamics of personal relationships (Benhabib 1992). 

2.      From “feminine” to “feminist” ethics of care

Motivated by the common intention of valorising care, feminist perspectives subscribing to the ethics of care are currently divided as regards the preselected strategy. In particular, mainly the first authors to examine the subject, have prioritised a moral and psychological approach, rendering care a feminine issue. Taking the dual mother/child relationship as the paradigm, the ethics of care are interpreted by these exponents of the "first generation" (Noddings 1984; Ruddick 1980) as the expression of a feminine point of view that is not complementary but superior to the ethics of justice based on rights (attributed to a typically masculine dimension), since they are centred around personal and direct relationships with others. The problem of characterizing care as a sort of feminine "virtue" to be extended to the world, is dual (Okin 1989, Tronto 1987, 1993) : on the one hand, this characterization is based on an essentialist ahistorical and immutable vision of femininity, which does not take account of differences between women; on the other hand, it is at risk of confirming widespread social stereotypes on the role of women as principle carers, thus confusing (allegedly) inherent attitudes with socialisation processes, that are often forced, in care work. As clarified by Gilligan herself more recently, the ability to glimpse a world moving from the value of care leads to the structuring of "a different voice," but this otherness does not depend on the gender of who expresses it, but instead occurs in its content (Gilligan, 2010).

In the effort to release care from the narrow confines of domestic life and its "feminine" connotations, second-generation feminist studies give up on the contrast between care and justice and, in fact, returning to the criticism of the thesis that is central to liberal political thinking, i.e. the (natural origin of the) separation between the public and the private sphere, denounce the negative effects arising from the systematic indifference of liberal justice theories and public policies for care and the issues linked thereto (such as the unequal distribution of care work, economic exploitation, social exclusion, lack of support by the state).

 Starting mainly from the works of Joan Tronto (Tronto 1987, 1993, 2005) the challenge, and at the same time the most important contribution of feminist studies on the subject, is thus to “deprivatize” care and to broaden its relevance to the social and political field. To this end, emphasis is placed on the political and culturally defined dimension of care: if it is true that, historically, care activities mainly concerned the private environment, and therefore mainly the individuals occupying that environment (women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities), but, as noted by Joan Tronto, that is a contingent fact.

Care relationships are not confined to the sphere of family or personal relationships; they concern (they must and they cannot but concern) men as well, and defining what care is becomes a political fact, in that it reflects the characteristics and values of each society. Even if the practice of care includes a series of “necessary” activities (such as those linked to reproduction and biological sustenance) that are irrelevant to the context, care still remains a political issue because it is not politically irrelevant to establish "who" is cared for, or "how" or "whom" or "what" one is responsible for caring for.

The additional contribution, originating from the feminist studies included in the "second generation" ethics of care theories (Tronto 1993; Sherwin 1992; Tong 1993; Hankivski 2004; Sevenhuijsen 1998; Battaglia 2014), is to draw attention to a powerful analytical perspective that is capable of deciphering some crucial contemporary phenomena. Such phenomena are born from the social changes of the last few decades, and are linked to the documented universal welfare crisis (supplanted in Europe by new regimes, such as family welfare), the ageing of the population, the entry of women into the workforce, instances of reconciliation between paid work and care work, the transformation of family models, and so forth. Such phenomena generate an urgent need for political reflection on social reproduction, while also providing the framework in which to position the denunciation of the “care crisis”, widely discussed nowadays (Tronto 2013; Fraser 2016).

This new perspective, provided by the feminist debate in order to confront the social transformations mentioned above, is the perspective of vulnerability, dependence, relatedness, understood as a constitutive and foundational dimension of the human condition (Kittay 1999). The centrality of this dimension is associated with a number of significant assumptions which owe much to the rethinking of the individualist subjectivity put forward by various theoretical views attributable to the so-called relational model. Although it is true that there are life phases or social conditions or diseases that make some subjects more vulnerable than others, all individuals are relational beings; all human beings are fragile and dependent to an extent, and destined to take on the roles of both care-giver and care-receiver at different times of their life (Nussbaum 2006; Tronto 2013).  

These theoretical assumptions, which obviously also have or should have major repercussions at the political level, are based on easily verifiable facts that could sound banal were it not for their subversive nature.

The universal character of vulnerability and dependence, which returns us, as underlined by Eva Feder Kittay (Kittay 1999), to our common condition as sons and daughters, is in fact a neglected, if not denied, aspect in the modern western world's political, economic and cultural history: a history marked by a general misconception of the value of care and the complexity of activities in which care manifests itself.

There is an interesting study by Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon (Fraser-Gordon, 2002), concerning the semantic shifts undergone by the concept of dependence since the late 18th century, where it is shown how gradually, with the advent of industrial society, the term ‘dependence’, although seen as a normal attribute of women, children and other weak/inferior subjects, takes on a negative connotation when associated with men, especially when confessed and demonstrated in public.

The dismissal of dependence as a common attribute of all human beings served to validate the image of the autonomous, self-sufficient subject that is free of any constraints of belonging, which is central to political liberalism. At the same time, that same dismissal has led to the stigmatization of dependence, by associating it with domination and hierarchy, confining it to private life and to specific disadvantaged social groups: children, the persons with disabilities, the elderly and, for a long time, women.

In this context, the theories of care have a significant critical potential in the deconstruction of the modern, liberal ideology of autonomy as absolute independence from others, and in demonstrating the unsustainability of describing society as a cooperative enterprise of free and equal subjects that inspires many theories of contemporary justice, starting with that of John Rawls (Rawls 1971 and 1993). Restoring care to a central position in the political sphere also entails discussing the assumptions of impartiality and interchangeability of abstractly conceived subjects that characterize liberal anthropology and the dominant concept of equality carried out by liberal rights theories (Benhabib 1992, Kittay 1999).

3.      On relation between care and rights

The question that needs to be answered is whether the adoption of an approach based on the political centrality of care, capable of accounting for actually existing relations between people and the dynamics of subordination produced historically is compatible with the language of rights, or not. On the one hand, one could claim (and this has actually been done) that this language has been too compromised by the liberal instances that accompany its historical and ideological origins and that, as such, it is inadequate for the purpose of accounting for the demands for justice related to the work of social reproduction (Held, 2004 and 2006). On the other hand, one could counter that the claim of universality of fundamental rights (despite their particular historical origin) and the fact that these rights make up an open list to which additions can always be made make this language suitable for the purpose of responding to the challenge of validating dependence and care as fundamental elements of the human condition.

My opinion, which has been widely examined, is that the care-rights pairing is not only a possible pairing, but is also strategically necessary.

I will justify my opinion below, in a schematic and non-exhaustive manner.

1) Firstly, the complexity of care – rooted in its being an articulate, multi-level concept that refers to a set of actions, relationships, values concerning not only our responsibilities towards others but also our actual state of being in the world – makes it difficult to turn the same into political program and public policies that could give rise to a different sort of society. This difficulty tends to increase when we move away from the field of personal or professional relationships (as the doctor-patient one) to address more general social justice. But also in the context of this kind of relationship, we need to appeal to some universal principles or standards in order to resolve conflicts and to justify decisions and actions (in this sense, there is some reference to an ethical-normative weakness of care ( Kushe 1997).

2) Secondly, as with all ethical perspectives, the approach based on care is not a self-sufficient ethic; as argued by one of its supporters, Joan Tronto, beyond any idealization, it is necessary to remember that the care relationship is always an asymmetrical and non-balanced relationship in which one of the subjects depends on the other (Tronto 1993). There are care relationships that mask oppression and domination; thus one of the first problems to solve concerns the issue of identifying and interpreting needs under a perspective that restores/highlights the role of the care-giver, but also the care-receiver's right to self-determination (White-Tronto 2004). The point of view of individual rights becomes fundamentally important for taking the needs of care-receivers seriously (otherwise they are at risk of being discounted as needy subjects) and for limiting the danger of authoritarian and (unjustifiably) paternalistic aptitudes that can occur in the practice of care relationships. An example of this view could be the case of persons with disabilities and the instances of self-determination claimed by exponents of disability studies.

3) Finally, one other area in which strategic interaction with human rights doctrines appears indispensable for a theory of care with an impact on the reform of political/economic/judicial structures and institutions, is access to and redistribution of resources. To this end, there have recently been proposals for the conceptualization of care as content of a universal human right which, in order to be more than just a right on paper, should mobilize institutions to identify the holders of the corresponding duties and induce them to provide support for care-givers, under the perspective of undertaking responsibilities that are not only individual/family ones, but also social and collective ones with respect to universal care needs (Sciurba, 2016). Such proposals are attractive but they have to come to terms with the documented welfare crisis and the unequal distribution of power within our societies. Not to mention the difficulties of transforming this universal right to giving and receiving care, into tangible political policies and programmes.

However, some recent legislative proposals in Europe (I have in mind particularly the Italian case) on support to family carers move in a different direction than what was expected by the authors of these ambitious proposals: these are initiatives that, despite taking a small step forward compared to the total invisibility of care and its costs, often see public institutions supporting family care activities, through the provision of financial assistance, without assuming direct responsibility[1]. Thus, these interventions do not question the logic behind the family welfare model that is widespread in Europe (Saraceno, 2006), where care is once again confined to the private sphere and very often ends up on the shoulders of mothers, wives, companions and daughters, who sometimes spend years caring for their dependent loved ones. Of course, that mainly happens when this care work can’t be delegated to another women, the migrant ones. (Kofman-Raghuram 2009).

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Biography:

Isabel Fanlo Cortés is an Associate professor of Sociology of Law, University of Genova, Italy